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TORTS
I. DEFAMATION
A. Qualified Privilege Extended to Summons, Complaint not
Served
In Padgett v. The Sun Publishing Co. and its companion
case, Stevens v. The Sun Publishing Co.,1 both of which were
defamation actions, the South Carolina Supreme Court held
that a qualified privilege attaches to the publication of pre-trial
documents, including the summons and the complaint.2 The
general rule regarding libelous statements made in the course of
judicial proceedings is that such statements are absolutely privi-
leged if relevant to the proceeding.3 The subsequent publication
of the statements is privileged only if made without malice.
These decisions place South Carolina in accord with the major-
ity rule.4
The dispute that led to the litigation in Padgett and Ste-
vens began when John L. Reaves filed a Summons, complaint
not served,5 in the office of Clerk of Court for Horry County.6 On
1. 278 S.C. 26, 292 S.E.2d 30 (1982).
2. Id. at 30-31, 292 S.E.2d at 33.
3. See, e.g., Sierra Madre Dev., Inc. v. Via Entrad Townhouses Ass'n, 20 Ariz. App.
550, 514 P.2d 503 (1973); Anderson v. Hartley, 222 Iowa 921, 270 N.W. 460 (1936); Ham-
mer v. Ford, 127 Minn. 146, 145 N.W. 810 (1916); Annot., 38 A.L.R.3d 272 (1971).
4. See, e.g., Fitch v. Daily News Publishing Co., 116 Neb. 474, 217 N.W. 947 (1928);
Annot., 59 A.L.R. 1056 (1929); Kilgore v. Koen, 133 Or. 1, 288 P. 192 (1930); Annot., 104
A.L.R. 1125 (1936).
5. In South Carolina the summons may be served with or without the complaint.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-13-230 (1976) states:
A copy of the complaint need not be served with the summons, except
when service is made upon a motor vehicle carrier under the provisions of § 15-
9-340 or upon a nonresident director of a domestic corporation under the pro-
visions of § 15-9-430. But if a copy of the complaint be not so served the sum-
mons must state where the complaint is or will be filed, and if the defendant,
within twenty days thereafter, causes notice of appearance to be given and, in
person or by attorney, demands in writing a copy of the complaint, specifying
the place within the State where it may be served, a copy thereof must within
twenty days thereafter be served accordingly. Only one copy of the complaint
need be served on the same attorney.
Dean Lightsey notes that "[T]he cases have indicated that the court will insist upon
1
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the face of this summons appeared "Cause of Action: Alienation
of Affection and Criminal Conversation."' 7 The named defen-
dants were James P. Stevens, Sr., James P. Stevens, Jr., and
Carroll D. Padgett." The complaint in this action was filed ap-
proximately three weeks later.
On March 28, 1977, Reaves instigated another lawsuit
against the same three defendants by filing a Summons and
Complaint charging the defendants with barratry and cham-
perty.9 None of the actions instituted were brought to trial.
The plaintiffs' allegations of defamation were based upon
reports of these three filings published in the Sun News. The
newspaper published an account of the summons, complaint not
served, despite admonitions by the elder Stevens to the newspa-
per's reporter that a summons was purely a jurisdictional tool
containing no allegations. The Sun News published the latter
two stories without making any effort to elicit a response from
the named defendants.1 L
At trial, the jury found for the plaintiffs and awarded them
$100,000 in actual damages and $200,000 in punitive damages.11
The court denied motions for a judgment n.o.v. and a new trial.
The defendant then appealed the denial of its motions to the
South Carolina Supreme Court on the grounds that a qualified
privilege protected the publication and that no evidence of ac-
tual malice was present in the record. 12 The court noted that
South Carolina law requires a Summons, complaint not served,
and complaints to be filed with the clerk of court.1 3 When filed,
the court reasoned, these documents become public records in
strict compliance with the requirements of the statute, perhaps, recognizing the possibil-
ity that the method of service may mislead lay defendants who might not fully under-
stand the seriousness of the document." H. LIGHTSEY, SOUTH CAROLINA CODE PLEADING
35 (1976).
6. Brief for Appellant at 2. This litigation arose amidst the background of a heated
political campaign. John L. Reaves opposed State Senator James P. Stevens, Sr. in his
bid for reelection. Previous litigation between the two included criminal charges brought
by Reaves against Stevens and divorce proceedings in which Stevens represented Reaves'
wife. 278 S.C. at 27-28, 292 S.E.2d at 31.
7. Record at 217.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 226-27.
10. Id. at 51, 118, 123, 178.
11. Id. at 217.
12. 278 S.C. at 32, 292 S.E.2d at 33-34.
13. Id. at 31, 292 S.E.2d at 33.
[Vol. 35162
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the court of a judicial proceeding.
Relying on Lybrand v. The State,14 the court stated that
the contents of documents filed in the course of judicial proceed-
ings are protected by a qualified privilege and may be published
without liability unless actual malice is shown. 5 The court noted
that actual malice occurs "when reporters and publishers depart
from responsible standards of investigation and print articles on
the basis of an admittedly unreliable source, without further
verification. -"' The court went on to observe that "[the] re-
cord is devoid of any evidence upon which to base a finding of
actual malice.' 1 7 Finding no fault on the part of the appellant,
the court ruled that Gertz v. Welch' s forbade the imposition of
liability upon the publication.' 9
The Lybrand decision provided the court with much of the
foundation for the result in Padgett.20 The earlier opinion recog-
nized that many jurisdictions did not include pleadings in the
class of judicial proceedings that may be published under a qual-
ified privilege.2 ' Courts of that era, wary of the potential for
14. 179 S.C. 208, 184 S.E. 580 (1935).
15. Id. at 218, 184 S.E. at 584.
16. 278 S.C. at 32, 292 S.E.2d at 34.
17. Id. at 32, 292 S.E.2d at 33. In finding no actual malice, the court noted that a
publisher may invoke the privilege by publishing the contents of public records with
"substantial accuracy." Id., 292 S.E.2d at 34. The court leaves for another day the in-
triguing question of how far a reporter may deviate from a verbatim report of the con-
tents of public records and still be "substantially accurate" within the meaning of the
privilege.
In their separate dissents, Justice Harwell and Justice Ness agreed that there were
obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the statements in the documents and that,
therefore, the jury could have reasonably found actual malice. The Sun News published
the contents of the documents despite the elder Stevens' admonitions and with knowl-
edge of the ongoing dispute between the parties to the instant cases. Both Justice Har-
well and Justice Ness urged that publication under these circumstances was tantamount
to a reckless disregard for the truth. Id. at 34-38, 292 S.E.2d at 35-37.
18. 418 U.S. 323 (1979).
19. In Gertz, the United States Supreme Court left it to the states to determine
their own standard of media liability to private individuals so long as the states did not
impose strict liability. Id. at 347.
20. 179 S.C. at 208, 184 S.E. at 580.
21. Id. at 212, 184 S.E. at 582. See, e.g., Bilt v. Cranford, 6 Ga. App. 145, 64 S.E. 488
(1909); Park v. Detroit Free Press Co., 72 Mich. 560, 40 N.W. 731 (1888); Nisson v. Dis-
patch Printing Co., 101 Minn. 309, 112 N.W. 258 (1907); Byers v. Meridian Printing Co.,
84 Ohio St. 408, 95 N.E. 917 (1911); American Publishing Co. v. Gamble, 115 Tenn. 663,
90 S.W. 1005 (1906); Fennegan v. Eagle Printing Co., 173 Wis. 5, 179 N.W. 788 (1920);
Annot., 52 A.L.R. 1438 (1928).
3
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abuse, frowned upon the publication with impunity of informa-
tion contained in pleadings prior to any indication that the suit
was genuine and not brought merely to take advantage of the
privilege.22 As the court in Lybrand pointed out, however, this
rule, in practice, would not provide any real protection against
publication of libelous statements.23
The Lybrand court noted that other jurisdictions distin-
guished pleadings from other matters in the course of judicial
proceedings on the grounds that until a trial or hearing is held,
pleadings are not discussed in open court.24 This distinction, the
court reasoned, would not protect a party against libel. Anyone
wishing to publish defamatory statements could file a libelous
pleading and then move to have the pleading amended. The mo-
tion to amend would require a hearing in open court; the publi-
cation of matters raised in open court would then, in any juris-
diction, be afforded a qualified privilege. Thus, the Lybrand
court reasoned that, with regard to the qualified privilege, any
distinction between pleadings and other matters was illusory.
The court asserted that publication of pleadings filed with a
court would therefore be protected by a qualified privilege.25
In extending the rule in Lybrand to include publication of a
Summons, complaint not served, the Padgett majority noted
that both a summons and a Summons, complaint not served,
must be filed with the clerk of court and are thus available for
public inspection. Since anyone who wishes to see either of these
documents may do so, the publication of either, the court rea-
soned, should be protected by a qualified privilege.2 6
22, See, e.g., Park v. Detroit Free Press Co., 72 Mich. 560, 40 N.W. 731 (1888):
One of the reasons why parties are privileged from suit for accusations
made in their pleadings is that the pleadings are addressed to the courts where
the facts can be fairly tried, and to no other readers. If pleadings and other
documents can be published to the world by anyone who gets access to them,
no more effectual way of doing malicious mischief with immunity could be de-
vised than filing papers containing false and scurrilous charges, and getting
those printed as news. . . . A suit thus brought with scandalous accusations
may be discontinued without any attempt to try it, or, on trial, the case may
entirely fail of proof or probability. The law has never authorized any such
mischief.
72 Mich. at 568-69, 40 N.W. at 734.
23. 179 S.C. at 213, 184 S.E. at 582.
24. Id. at 217-18, 184 S.E. at 584.
25. Id. at 218, 184 S.E. at 584.
26. 278 S.C. at 32-33, 292 S.E.2d at 34.
[Vol. 35
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Courts in most jurisdictions are in accord with the result
reached in Padgett. Following the landmark decision in Camp-
bell v. New York Evening Post,2 7 courts have extended the qual-
ified privilege to pre-trial documents, reasoning that these docu-
ments are public records and their publication is merely a report
of information already available for public inspection.
Padgett v. Sun News should alleviate much of the confusion
surrounding the publication of matters in the course of judicial
proceedings. News media personnel now have a bright line indi-
cating under what circumstances pre-trial documents may be
published.
David C. Morrison
B. QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE DOES NOT PROTECT INACCURATE
REPORTS OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
In Jones v. Sun Publishing Co.,28 the South Carolina Su-
preme Court held that a journalist's inaccurate and defamatory
reports of judicial proceedings are not protected by a qualified
privilege. Liability for inaccurate reports may be imposed if a
jury finds that the defamatory error resulted from the negligence
of the publisher or his employee. The court's decision in Jones
may also allow juries to measure a reporter's actions against a
reasonable man standard rather than against the standards ob-
served within the journalism profession.
James Jones and four other men were arrested in Horry
County on "tape pirating" charges in 1975.29 Two months after
the arrests, Monk, a reporter for Sun Publishing's Myrtle Beach
newspaper, placed a call to the Columbia office of the United
States Attorney and spoke with Williams, the attorney prosecut-
ing the case against Jones and the others. Williams told Monk
that four men had pleaded guilty to the charges that afternoon
in Florence. He then gave Monk four names, spelling each one.
Although notes made by Monk during the conversation showed
James Jones to be among those pleading guilty, the charges
27. 245 N.Y. 320, 157 N.E. 153 (1977). Campbell was among the first cases that
broke with the old rule and extended the qualified privilege to pleadings filed with a
court official.
28. 278 S.C. 12, 292 S.E.2d 23 (1982), cert. denied, - U.S. - (1982).
29. Record at 16.
5
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against Jones had actually been dropped.
An article published the next day in the Sun paper reported
that James Jones and three others had pleaded guilty to tape
pirating charges. Williams' supervisor was quoted as the source
of the information. Following publication of this article, Jones
brought a libel suit against the newspaper.
At trial, the jury found for Jones in the amount of $35,000.
The judge entered a judgment n.o.v. for the defendant, ruling
that there was insufficient evidence to support a verdict for the
plaintiff. On appeal, the supreme court reversed the trial court
and reinstated the jury's verdict.
The court found sufficient evidence in the record to support
a finding of negligence on the part of Monk30 and discussed two
possible grounds for such a finding. First, the jury may have
concluded that Williams had correctly relayed the contents of
the record and that Monk misunderstood him or inadvertently
recorded the wrong name in his notes 3 1 Alternatively, the court
suggested that the jury could have found that Monk failed to act
according to "acceptable standards of reporting" by relying on
his conversation with Williams rather than checking the records
himself.3 2 The court concluded that either ground would warrant
a finding of "some measure of legal fault,"3 the standard to be
used since Jones was not a public figure. 4
The supreme court also rejected the theory that inaccurate
reports of the contents of judicial proceedings and other matters
of public record are protected by a qualified privilege.35 While
30. 278 S.C. at 14, 292 S.E.2d at 24.
31. Id., 292 S.E.2d at 24.
32. Id. at 14-15, 292 S.E.2d at 24.
33. Id. at 15, 292 S.E.2d at 24.
34. The supreme court relied upon Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974),
in support of its decision to apply a negligence standard in Jones. In Gertz, the United
States Supreme Court held that in cases involving defamation of nonpublic figures,
states may impose liability "so long as they do not impose liability without fault." 418
U.S. at 347.
35. The court compared the facts in Jones to those in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424
U.S. 448 (1976). In Firestone, the plaintiff was married to a tire empire heir. The couple
became embroiled in a lengthy separation dispute. While the plaintiff's husband's coun-
terclaim for divorce alleged adultery and extreme cruelty, the Florida court granted the
divorce on other grounds. Time, relying on reports from wire services, a correspondent,
and a "stringer," published a brief article reporting that the husband's counterclaim had
been awarded on grounds of adultery and extreme cruelty. The court in Firestone held
that the first amendment did not require protection of erroneous reports, even though
[Vol. 35
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previous South Carolina decisions 6 have upheld the right to
publish anything appearing in judicial records, defamatory or
otherwise, the court refused to extend the qualified privilege to
erroneous reports.
37
Even if an erroneous report is not privileged, a finding of
fault must be made before liability is imposed s.3  The court's fail-
ure to adequately explain its reasoning in Jones is thus troub-
ling, for a close examination of the opinion and the record indi-
cates that liability without fault may have been imposed.
The court found a jury issue in whether "the U.S. attorney
erred in reading the names to Monk, or whether the reporter
erred in writing them down." s9 No evidence is present in the re-
cord, however, to show an error by Monk. Monk's notes taken
during the conversation with Williams include the plaintiff's
the subject matter might be of some "informational value." Id. at 455-56.
The court's reliance on Firestone as a guideline for first amendment requirements is
well placed. Although the facts in Firestone differ significantly from those in Jones, the
Firestone court's discussion of Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), cited
in Jones, indicates that the rule in Firestone has a scope of application extending be-
yond its own facts. In Cox, a television reporter went to a courthouse and, by checking
records open to the public, discovered the name of a teenage girl who had been raped
and murdered. Georgia had a statute prohibiting the broadcast of the names of rape
victims. The Court reasoned that the first and fourteenth amendments protected any
information available to the general public from state censorship, 420 U.S. at 494-96.
The Firestone Court's reliance on Cox implies that erroneous reports gathered from any
source may be unprotected.
Firestone represents the latest relevant development in the line of cases that began
with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Sullivan held that a public
official could not bring an action for defamation absent a showing of malice. Curtis Pub-
lishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1968), extended the doctrine to include public figures.
The rule was extended further by the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), which introduced a subject-matter test of public versus private
interest. 'Any report of a matter of public interest would be protected by the Sullivan
rule. Gertz rejected this dichotomy and reverted to a public figure standard.
36. McClain v. Multimedia, Inc., 275 S.C. 282, 270 S.E.2d 124 (1980); Lybrand v.
The State Co., 179 S.C. 208, 184 S.E. 580 (1936).
37. 278 S.C. at 16, 292 S.E.2d at 25. The court did not address the status of the
qualified privilege as developed in the common law of South Carolina after Sullivan.
Pre-Sullivan cases in South Carolina held that qualifiedly privileged reports would not
give rise to a cause of action absent a showing of malice. The publisher would be liable if
he abused or went beyond the requirements of the occasion. See Cullum v. Dun and
Bradstreet, Inc., 228 S.C. 384, 90 S.E.2d 370 (1956); Fulton v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.,
220 S.C. 287, 67 S.E.2d 415 (1951).
38. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 459; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at
39. 278 S.C. at 14, 292 S.E.2d at 24.
7
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name,40 and all names were spelled out by Williams. Further,
Williams admitted that on other occasions he had confused the
various Joneses in his mind,41 and that it was possible he had
made the same mistake while talking to Monk.42 He also stated
that he had no "specific recollection" of what he said during the
conversation. 3
The court also inadequately explains its second ground for a
finding of negligence. The opinion does not suggest how a jury
could conclude that Monk departed from acceptable journalistic
standards. The jury could not have found that Monk failed to
meet standards observed within his profession-a determination
of "journalistic malpractice"" - because no expert testimony
on this issue was offered at trial. 5 The only evidence of the
usual practice of reporters in South Carolina was offered by Wil-
liams, who testified that it was accepted and customary practice
for out-of-town reporters to gather information about criminal
proceedings in the federal court by calling his Columbia office.46
The court commented that this practice was unnecessary in this
instance. The "six day hiatus between the guilty pleas and the
publication of the defamatory article negates any rush by the
respondent to print 'hot news.' ",47 A reading of the record
reveals, however, that Monk's article was indeed hot news since
it was published the day after the guilty pleas were entered.48
Six days had passed since the charges against Jones were actu-
ally dropped, but that act was not the subject of Monk's
40. Brief of Respondent at 8.
41. Record at 77.
42. Id. at 89.
43. Id. at 77.
44. For a discussion of the journalistic malpractice standard, see R. SACK, LIBEL,
SLANDER AND RELATED PROBLEMS 253-55 (1980).
45. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B comment g (1965), gives the fol-
lowing standard:
The defendant, if a professional disseminator of news, such as a newspa-
per, a magazine, or a broadcasting station, or an employee, such as a reporter,
is held to the skill and experience normally possessed by members of that pro-
fession.... Customs and practices within the profession are relevant in ap-
plying the negligence standard, which is, to a substantial degree, set by the
profession itself...
46. Record at 70, 71.
47. 278 S.C. at 15, 292 S.E.2d at 24.
48. Record at 88-89.
168 [Vol. 35
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 13
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol35/iss1/13
TORTS
article.4
The failure of the trial court or the supreme court to require
expert testimony on journalistic standards suggests that South
Carolina has adopted a reasonable man standard for judging the
actions of reporters.50 Application of this standard does not,
however, explain the court's decision in Jones. No evidence ap-
pears in the record that would lead to the conclusion that a rea-
sonably prudent man would have acted any differently than
Monk. 1
The South Carolina Supreme Court has imposed a stringent
standard upon journalists in this state. The court has deter-
mined that a reporter should not rely on information gathered
from a public official, but instead should read the actual records
before publishing his report. Publishers and their counsel would
be well advised to review their information gathering procedures
and standards in light of the decision in Jones.
Theodore B. DuBose
II. VICARIOUS LIABiLITY
In Fernander v. Thigpen,2 the South Carolina Supreme
Court extended the liability of a franchisor to the torts of an
employee of its franchisee. This decision weakens the ability of a
franchisor to contractually relieve itself of liability for acts of the
franchisee or its employees.
Brenda Fernander was killed while riding home with the as-
49. Id. at 88.
50. This standard has also been adopted by the Supreme Court of Tennessee:
In determining the issue of liability, the conduct of the defendant is to be
measured against what a reasonably prudent person would or would not have
done under the same or similar circumstances. This is the ordinary negligence
test that we adopt, not a "journalistic malpractice" test whereby liability is
based upon a departure from supposed standards of care set by publishers
themselves.
Memphis Publishing Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412, 418 (Tenn. 1978); see also Troman
v. Wood, 62 Ili.2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1977).
51. For cases factually similar to Jones but with contrary results, see LeBoef v.
Times Picayune Publishing Corp., 327 So.2d 430 (La. App. 1976); Wilson v. Capital City
Press, 315 So.2d 430 (La. App. 1975). Reporters relied on public officials for their infor-
mation, and the officials misstated the public records. The courts held that the defen-
dants had not deviated from acceptable standards in relying on a supposedly reliable
source.
52. 278 S.C. 140, 293 S.E.2d 424 (1982).
1983]
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sistant manager of the Burger Chef in which she worked. Her
estate filed wrongful death and survival actions against the assis-
tant manager, Burger Chef Systems, Inc. (Burger Chef), and A &
H Foods, Inc. (A & H Foods), the Sumter franchise of Burger
Chef. The trial court granted summary judgment for Burger
Chef based on its franchise agreement with A & H Foods. 3 On
appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed and
remanded.
The supreme court addressed two issues in Fernander:
whether an agency relationship existed between Burger Chef
and A & H Foods and whether the franchise agreement absolved
Burger Chef of liability.5 '
Initially, the court distinguished Murphy v. Holiday Inns,
Inc.,5 a similar case upon which the lower court had based its
summary judgment. It noted that the Virginia Supreme Court in
Murphy had not considered the issue of apparent authority and
that the plaintiff there had furnished only the licensing agree-
ment as evidence of an agency relationship. Since the plaintiff in
Fernander presented direct testimony of several A & H Foods
employees and pursued the theory of apparent authority, the su-
preme court reasoned Murphy was not dispositive.5 8
The court then examined the doctrine of apparent author-
ity. It noted the testimony of two A & H Foods employees who
stated that they thought Burger Chef was A & H Foods. The
court also considered the physical indicia of the franchise, such
as the Burger Chef trademark on napkins, uniforms, and adver-
tising. The majority found that this evidence supported an infer-
ence of an agency relationship between the two corporations, de-
spite an express provision in their franchise agreement stating
that A & H Foods was an independent contractor.
57
After finding evidence of an agency relationship, the court
53. Record at 40. Some confusion exists on when summary judgment was actually
granted. The supreme court stated that the trial court ruled after an examination of the
franchise agreement. In a petition for rehearing, however, the respondent-petitioner ar-
gued that this was an inaccurate statement because the trial court also considered testi-
mony submitted concerning the issues of actual agency, apparent authority, and agency
by estoppel.
54. 278 S.C. at 142, 293 S.E.2d at 425.
55. 216 Va. 490, 219 S.E.2d 874 (1975).
56. 278 S.C. at 142, 293 S.E.2d at 426.
57. Id. at 143, 293 S.E.2d at 426; Record at 63.
170 [Vol. 35
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turned to the more traditional "right to control" test.5a The
court noted that Burger Chef retained control over the trade-
marks, the menu, the quality of food, and the food preparation
procedures. The court also found that Burger Chef controlled
the daily operating policies and management of the employees.
This finding was based upon a provision in the franchise agree-
ment that enabled Burger Chef to require compliance by all per-
sonnel "with all reasonable requirements" made by Burger
Chef.59 The court concluded by holding that sufficient evidence
existed to take the agency issue to the jury and remanded the
case for a new trial.60
The supreme court may have erroneously found evidence of
apparent authority in Fernander. Apparent authority generally
is used in contractual matters to prevent a principal from hold-
ing out a party as his agent and later denying the relationship
when a third party has reasonably relied upon the misrepresen-
tation."' The doctrine embraces two elements: a representation
by the principal, either directly to a third party or to the com-
munity, that an agent is authorized to bind the principal and a
reasonable reliance upon the representation by the third party.62
The court failed to discuss these elements in the context of
Fernander. Neither the assistant manager nor Burger Chef Sys-
tems made any representation that transportation from work
was a service provided by Burger Chef. In fact, the agreement
and custom between A & H Foods and its employees was the
opposite.63 Moreover, both the assistant manager and Brenda
Fernander's father testified that they thought the assistant man-
ager was taking Brenda home "as a favor."'" The estate also of-
58. 278 S.C. at 144, 293 S.E.2d at 426. The right to control test is applied according
to the standards of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958), and is used to
determine whether a master-servant relationship exists to hold the principal liable. Id. at
§ 219. Absent this relationship, the principal cannot be liable for physical harm caused
by his agent. Id. at § 250.
59. 278 S.C. at 144, 293 S.E.2d at 426-27. Record at 50.
60. 278 S.C. at 144, 293 S.E.2d at 427.
61. Fochtman v. Clanton's Auto Auction Sales, 233 S.C. 581, 106 S.E.2d 272 (1958);
Mortgage and Acceptance Corp. v. Stewart, 142 S.C. 375, 140 S.E. 804 (1927); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 8, 159 comment b, 267 (1958).
62. Gizzi v. Texaco, Inc., 437 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 265 (1958).
63. Record at 86. This was the first instance in which the assistant manager had
ever taken an employee home.
64. Record at 74, 88, 157-58.
19831 TORTS
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fered no proof of reasonable reliance by the deceased or her fam-
ily, a point discussed by the dissent.6 5 Neither Brenda nor her
family could have reasonably relied upon the assistant man-
ager's offer as being cloaked with the authority of Burger Chef;
he was clearly acting in an individual capacity outside the ap-
parent scope of his employment with A & H Foods.
However, even if evidence of apparent authority existed, the
majority should have noted that a principal is not liable for the
acts of an agent outside the apparent scope of his employment.6
Brenda Fernander's ride home after work was not within the ap-
parent scope of the assistant manager's employment and Burger
Chef should not have been liable for his negligence.
In addition to the problems with its apparent authority
analysis, the court misapplied the traditional "right to control"
test. 7 Although Murphy was distinguished on other grounds,
the test employed in Murphy was the test normally utilized by
the South Carolina Supreme Court to determine tort liability in
a franchise situation. 8 Therefore, the significance of the decision
should not be diminished greatly. The plaintiff in Murphy
sought damages for injuries suffered at a Holiday Inn motel. Af-
ter examining the agreement between Holiday Inn and its licen-
see, the Virginia Supreme Court found that Holiday Inn had not
retained enough control over the day-to-day operation of the
motel necessary to make it liable. The court noted that although
Holiday Inn controlled the architecture, furnishings, and equip-
ment, it retained no power to hire or fire employees, fix prices,
set expenditures, determine working conditions, or share in the
profit or loss.6 9 Because Holiday Inn lacked the necessary daily
control, the court denied any principal-agent and master-servant
relationship between the two defendants.
Similarly, in Fernander, Burger Chef had no power to hire
or fire employees,'7 0 control business expenses,' 1 or directly su-
65. 278 S.C. at 146-48, 293 S.E.2d at 428-29.
66. 233 S.C. at 587, 106 S.E.2d at 275; RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY §§ 228,
267 comment b, illustration 3 (1958).
67. Burriss v. Texaco, Inc., 361 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1966); Young v. War, 252 S.C.
179, 165 S.E.2d 797 (1969); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(a)(1958).
68. See, e.g., Hubbard v. Rowe, 192 S.C. 12, 5 S.E.2d 187 (1939).
69. 216 Va. at 495, 219 S.E.2d at 878.
70. Record at 81-83, 122, 128-29.
71. Id. at 53-54.
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pervise inventory levels. 2 In addition, A & H Foods bore the
entire risk of loss.78 Since Burger Chef retained no control over
day-to-day operating procedures or personnel management, the
court could easily have denied liability by finding that the requi-
site right to control was missing.
In extending the liability of a franchisor to include the torts
of its franchisee's agent, 4 the supreme court has misinterpreted
the thrust of the doctrine of apparent authority and weakened
the right to control test. The extension of these theories threat-
ens the fundamental reasons for franchising. In order to avoid
situations such as Fernander, the franchisor could eliminate all
control over its franchisee's daily operations and attempt to
avoid the holding out element of apparent authority by commu-
nicating to the public the franchisee's true status. These alterna-
tives, however, can mitigate the uniformity of the franchised
business, thereby reducing the value of its reputation and trade-
mark. Consequently, the only viable option remaining for a
franchisor is the acquisition of expanded liability insurance
coverage.75
Ruth Elaine Folline
HI. NEGLIGENCE
A. Presumptions Against a Minor's Capacity for Negligence
Abrogated in South Carolina
In Standard v. Shine,6 the South Carolina Supreme Court
rewrote this state's law concerning a minor's capacity for con-
tributory negligence. The question of whether a minor has the
72. See id. at 47-49.
73. Id. at 67.
74. There are several popular theories in tort jurisprudence which, though not ex-
plicitly used by the court, might explain the thinking behind the result it reached. Likely
examples include the "Deep Pocket Theory" (the master is liable because he is able to
pay for the misfortunes that his business caused), the "Risk Distribution Theory" (the
loss should be placed on the master because he is most likely to reflect the cost in the
product price), and the "General Deterrence Theory" (if dangerous activities are made
more expensive, the master will find a safer substitute). J.D. HINMS, AGENCY AND PART-
NERs~in 39, 42-43 (1924).
75. See BORCHAED & EHULICH, Franchisor-Tort Liability: Minimizing the Potential
Liability of a Franchisor for a Franchisee's Torts, 69 TRDE-MARK REP. 109, 123 (1979).
76. - S.C. -, 295 S.E.2d 786 (1982).
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capacity for primary negligence was decided for the first time.
The court held that presumptions against the capacity of minors
to be negligent will no longer be recognized. The standard of
care to which minors will be held in primary and contributory
negligence is the standard of behavior expected of a child of like
age, intelligence, and experience under similar circumstances. 
7
The court also construed the South Carolina Parental Responsi-
bility Act for the first time,"' holding that age-based presump-
tions will not be allowed when determining the capacity of mi-
nors to commit malicious and intentional torts under the Act's
provisions. 9
Appellant Larry Shine, Jr., age six, allegedly started a fire,
which resulted in substantial damage to an apartment owned by
the respondent and leased by the appellants. Respondent sought
to recover actual damages. Appellants asserted that a minor
under seven years of age is legally incapable of negligence or a
malicious and intentional tort and demurred to the complaint.
Appeal was taken from the trial court's order denying the
demurrer.80
The supreme court held that the demurrer was properly de-
nied. In a unanimous decision, the court reasoned that because
children of the same age do not always have the same abilities,
no arbitrary limits should exist regarding the capacity of minors
to be either primarily or contributorily negligent. Noting that
the issue of a minor's capacity for primary negligence was one of
first impression in South Carolina, the court stated that under
the "prevailing view' 'sl primary and contributory negligence
77. Id. at -, 295 S.E.2d at 787.
78. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-340 (Supp. 1981) provides:
When any unmarried minor under the age of seventeen years and living
with his parent shall maliciously and intentionally destroy, damage or steal
property, real, personal or mixed, the owner of such property shall be entitled
to recover from such parent of such minor actual damages in a civil action
court of competent jurisdiction in an amount not exceeding one thousand dol-
lars; provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall in any way limit
the application of the family purpose doctrine.
The complaint, in part, charged liability under § 15-75-30 of the 1976 Code. That sec-
tion, with language identical to that in the present section, was repealed in 1981 as part
of a reorganization of sections referring to domestic and juvenile matters and was re-
placed by the present section.
79. - S.C. at , 295 S.E.2d at 788.
80. Id. at -, 295 S.E.2d at 787.
81. Id. at -, 295 S.E.2d at 787.
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should be treated alike with regard to the abolition of age-based
presumptions of capacity.
After putting primary and contributory negligence on an
equal footing, the court set forth the standard of care required
of all minors charged with either form of negligence. Adopted
from the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the standard of con-
duct for a minor under fourteen years of age is that expected of
a child of like age, intelligence, and experience under like
circumstances.8 2
More than sixty years ago the South Carolina Supreme
Court held in Sexton v. Moll Construction Co.,83 that a child
under seven years old was, as a matter of law, incapable of con-
tributory negligence." This rule was derived from a common-law
presumption that a child under seven was incapable of commit-
ting a crime.85
Similar categorical rules were later created regarding older
children. In Chitwood v. Chitwood,8 6 the court recognized a re-
buttable presumption of incapacity in children aged seven to
fourteen and a presumption of capacity for contributory negli-
gence in older children. 7
82. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 283A (1965). Comment b cites factors in ad-
dition to age that should be taken into account in determining if the minor is contribu-
torily negligent, i.e., the living conditions of the child, his experience in dealing with
particular hazards, and his education concerning those hazards. Id.
83. 108 S.C. 516, 95 S.E. 129 (1918).
84. Id. at 521, 95 S.E. at 130. See also Butler v. Temples, 227 S.C. 496, 88 S.E.2d
586 (1955); Limehouse v. Southern Ry. Co., 216 S.C. 424, 58 S.E.2d 685 (1950); King v.
Holliday, 116 S.C. 463, 108 S.E. 186 (1921).
85. In 1902 the Illinois Supreme Court analogized the common law rule which ex-
empted children under seven years old from criminal prosecution to the defense of con-
tributory negligence. Thus was created the "Illinois rule," which asserted that children
under seven were incapable of contributory negligence. Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Tuohy,
196 Ill. 410, 63 N.E. 997 (1902). But cf. Collins v. South Boston H.R. Co., 142 Mass. 301,
7 N.E. 856 (1886), which involved allegations of contributory negligence of a four year-
old boy and his eleven year-old sister in an accident in which the boy was run over by a
horse drawn streetcar. The court set forth the Massachusetts rule: "[C]hldren as well as
adults should use their prudence and discretion which persons of their years ordinarily
have.... They cannot be permitted with impunity to indulge in conduct which they
know, or ought to know, to be careless." Id. at 317, 7 N.E. at 860.
86. 159 S.C. 109, 156 S.E. 179 (1930).
87. Id. at 112, 156 S.E. at 180. The categories were delineated in multiples of seven,
a scheme of Biblical origin which Dean Prosser termed "a poor reason for such arbitrary
limits." W. PRosSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTs 156 (4th ed. 1971). According to
Prosser, "[U]ndoubtedly there is some irreducible minimum [age at which a minor is
incapable of negligence]... but it ought not to be fixed by rules laid down in advance
15
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The court in Chitwood proposed a two-part test for cases
involving alleged contributory negligence of minors. First, the
above presumptions are engaged to determine the child's capac-
ity for contributory negligence. Second, if the child is found ca-
pable, it must be determined whether he exercised due care.",
The test of due care under Chitwood is whether the child acted
as a child of his age, capacity, discretion, knowledge, and experi-
ence ordinarily would under the same or similar circumstances.8
The Chitwood standard of due care is quite similar to the
standard adopted by the court in Shine. The Shine court has
removed the capacity issue, step one in Chitwood, and left as the
only issue whether the child exercised that degree of care ex-
pected of a child of like age, intelligence, and experience under
like circumstances.
In Sexton and Chitwood, the minors involved were plain-
tiffs, and thus the issue in both cases was whether a minor is
capable of contributory negligence. Shine is distinguishable be-
cause the minor was a defendant and the issue was his capacity
for primary negligence. While a minor's capacity for primary
negligence is a question not previously addressed by the South
Carolina Supreme Court,90 dicta in several of its contributory
negligence decisions suggest that no distinction existed between
a minor's capacity for contributory negligence and his capacity
for primary negligence. In King v. Holliday,91 the court sug-
gested that a four-year-old was incapable of either trespass or
negligence. Two children under the age of seven were found to
be incapable of personal negligence in Limehouse v. Southern
Ry. Co.0 2 The court in Butler v. Temples93 found a two-year-old
incapable of negligence. Under Shine, presumptions of incapac-
ity are inapplicable to either primary or contributory negligence
by minors of any age.
without regard to the particular case." Id.
88. 159 S.C. at 112-13, 156 S.E. at 180-81.
89. Id. at 113, 156 S.E. at 180.
90. - S.C. at -, 295 S.E.2d at 787.
91. 116 S.C. 463, 466, 108 S.E. 186, 187 (1921)(a four year-old boy recovered against
the owner of an automobile that struck the boy when he was on a highway).
92. 216 S.C. 424, 427, 58 S.E.2d 685, 687 (1950)(Two minor passengers in a car
driven by their mother were injured when the car was struck by a train. The court did
not elaborate on its use of the term "personal negligence.").
93. 227 S.C. 496, 502, 88 S.E.2d 586, 589 (1955)(a two year-old girl was killed while
playing in her driveway by a guest backing out his automobile).
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Plaintiffs found further grounds for recovery, albeit a lim-
ited recovery, in the Parental Responsibility Act. The court fo-
cused on section 20-7-340 which provides that the parent of
"any unmarried minor ' 94 living at home will be liable to the
owner of property maliciously damaged by the minor up to one
thousand dollars. The court concluded that the legislature's lan-
guage, which does not admit exceptions due to age, encompassed
the defendant and therefore the demurrer to section 20-7-340
was properly overruled.9 5 This aspect of the decision assures
that a child's age will not automatically bar his parents' liability
under South Carolina's parental responsibility statute.
Standard v. Shine will have a significant impact on the dis-
position of cases involving the negligence and contributory negli-
gence of minors. Parties will no longer benefit from the pre-
sumptions of capacity and incapacity when prosecuting or
defending claims. As a result, disputes of this kind will necessi-
tate an inquiry into the minor's conduct based on his age, intel-
ligence, experience, and the particular circumstances surround-
ing the incident in question. In actions brought under the
Parental Responsibility Act, there will be no presumption that
the minor was incapable of committing a malicious act.
Douglas A. Barfield, Jr.
B. Last Clear Chance does not Apply When Plaintiff's
Contributory Negligence Continues Until the Injury Occurs
In Brown v. George, 6 the South Carolina Supreme Court
limited application of the last clear chance doctrine to instances
in which the plaintiff's negligence is so distant in the chain of
causation that it is, as a matter of law, not a proximate cause of
his injury.9 7 Thus, the last clear chance doctrine will not be rec-
ognized if the plaintiff's contributory negligence continues until
the injury occurs.
94. - S.C. at -, 295 S.E.2d at 787 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-340 (Supp.
1981)(emphasis supplied by the court)).
95. - S.C. at -, 295 S.E.2d at 787-88.
96. - S.C. -, 294 S.E.2d 35 (1982).
97. - S.C. at -, 294 S.E.2d at 36 (citing Smith v. Blackwell, 250 S.C. 170, 156
S.E.2d 867 (1967); Hopkins v. Reynolds, 243 S.C. 568, 135 S.E.2d 75 (1964); Seay v.
Southern Ry., 205 S.C. 162, 315 S.E.2d 133 (1944)).
1983]
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In Brown, the respondent brought suit to recover damages
for injuries sustained when the appellant's automobile struck
him. Around ten o'clock in the morning Brown exited from a
truck parked off the shoulder of the road across from a liquor
store and began to cross the highway. Appellant George was
driving approximately fifty to fifty-five miles per hour, and was
about two hundred fifty yards south of the store when he saw
Brown in the left lane.9 8 George testified that he immediately
sounded his horn, hit his brakes, and swerved slightly to the
right. He further testified that the respondent glanced in his di-
rection.9 The respondent's companion who had seen the acci-
dent, testified that Brown had walked in front of the appellant's
sliding car.100 The respondent testified that although he had
been drinking since four o'clock that morning, he was not drunk,
but merely "good and high."
I
The jury awarded Brown a $15,000 verdict, and the defen-
dants appealed, arguing that the denial of their motion for ei-
ther judgment n.o.v. or for a new trial was error. The appellants
alleged that the trial judge had erred in charging the last clear
chance doctrine. 0 2 The supreme court agreed, reversed, and re-
manded for entry of judgment for the appellants.
The majority in Brown stated that the last clear chance rule
is not applicable in every case in which the plaintiff is contribu-
torily negligent. "It applies only where the antecedent negli-
gence of the plaintiff has become remote in the chain of causa-
tion and a mere condition of his injury. [The doctrine] does not
apply when the plaintiff's act combines with the defendant's act
as a proximate cause of the injury.' 0 3 The court reasoned that
since the respondent was concurrently negligent in walking from
a place of safety into the path of appellant's automobile, the
doctrine was inapplicable.1 0 4 The court also stated that when an
98. - S.C. at -, 294 S.E.2d at 36; Record at 44.
99. - S.C. at -, 294 S.E.2d at 36; Record at 44-45.
100. - S.C. at -, 294 S.E.2d at 36.
101. Id. at -, 294 S.E.2d at 36; Record at 23, 30.
102. The appellants also alleged that the trial judge had erroneously charged the
jury to consider the plaintiff's intoxicated condition when determining a pedestrian's
duty when crossing a highway. - S.C. at _ 294 S.E.2d at 36. The supreme court
agreed with appellant that this charge was prejudicial. Id. at , 294 S.E.2d at 37.
103. Id. at .. , 294 S.E.2d at 36.
104. - S.C. at -, 294 S.E.2d at 36.
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emergency arises too suddenly for a defendant to avoid the acci-
dent, the last clear chance doctrine does not apply.105 As the ma-
jority viewed the evidence, the appellant did not have sufficient
time to avoid harming Brown, who had negligently placed him-
self in peril. Therefore, the trial judge should not have charged
the last clear chance rule.108
Despite a vigorous dissent,10 7 the case is decided correctly
under South Carolina law. Cases in this state discussing the last
clear chance doctrine generally exhibit one of two typical fact
patterns. In the first type of case, the helpless plaintiff is in a
position of peril from which he cannot extricate himself l08 In
the second type of case, the plaintiff is not helpless and, in fact,
contributes to the accident.109 Cases that fall into the first cate-
gory contain a question of fact regarding the defendant's negli-
gence. Cases that fall into the second category contain an issue
of law-whether the plaintiff was contributorily negligent-and
should result in a judgment for the defendant, because the
plaintiff could have prevented the injury had he exercised due
care.110 Brown falls into the latter category. The majority found,
105. Id. at -, 294 S.E.2d at 36 (citing Durant v. Stuckey, 221 S.C. 342, 70 S.E.2d
473 (1952)).
106. - S.C. at -, 294 S.E.2d at 36-37.
107. Id. at -, 294 S.E.2d at 37 (Ness, J., dissenting). The dissent focused on the
appellant's testimony that he first saw the respondent from a distance of at least two
hundred yards. Justice Ness reasoned that the jury could have found that the appellant
had an opportunity to avoid injuring the respondent. Citing Cooper v. Driggers, 276 S.C.
299, 277 S.E.2d 893 (1981), the dissent concluded that the evidence was sufficient to
warrant application of the last clear chance doctrine.
The dissent's analysis fails to recognize one of the requirements for invocation of the
last clear chance doctrine as enunciated in Cooper. Under Cooper, the doctrine is inap-
plicable unless "the defendant sees that a negligent plaintiff is in a predicament from
which he may not extricate himself." Id. at 301, 277 S.E.2d at 894. The only evidence
that suggests such a predicament in Brown is the respondents drunkenness. Further
evidence shows, however, that the respondent was able to walk across the highway, ne-
gating any inference that he could not extricate himself from the peril. Cf. infra note
116.
108. E.g., Smith v. Blackwell, 250 S.C. 170, 156 S.E.2d 867 (1967); Jones v. Atlanta-
Charlotte Air Line Ry. Co., 218 S.C. 537, 63 S.E.2d 476 (1951).
109. E.g., Eastern Brick & Tile Co., Inc. v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 216 (D.S.C.
1968); Page v. United States, 212 F. Supp. 668 (D.S.C. 1963); Farrell v. Weinard, 143 F.
Supp. 939 (D.S.C. 1956); Durant v. Stuckey, 221 S.C. 342, 70 S.E.2d 473 (1952).
110. The jury determines liability only when a reasonable difference of opinion ex-
ists over whose act produced the injury. If "it clearly appears from the evidence that
there was contributory negligence or gross contributory negligence proximately entering
into and contributing to the accident at the time of its occurrence, it is the duty of the
19
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as a matter of law, that the plaintiff was concurrently negligent,
thus barring the application of the last clear chance doctrine.11
The essential elements of the last clear chance rule as it ap-
plies in South Carolina appear in Jones v. Atlanta-Charlotte Air
Line Ry. Co." 2 The first requirement is that the negligent plain-
tiff was, immediately before the accident, "unable to avoid it by
the exercise of reasonable vigilance and care.1113 As the majority
in Brown viewed the evidence, the respondent could have
avoided the accident through reasonable caution.1 Although he
was "good and high"""5 the respondent was able to walk across
the highway and, in the majority's opinion, should have been
able to perceive approaching vehicles. 1 e Because the respondent
directly contributed to the accident through his continuing neg-
ligence, the first requirement for the application of the rule is
not met, and the doctrine cannot be applied.
117
court to so find as a matter of law." Truett v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 206 S.C. 144,
152, 33 S.E.2d 396, 399 (1945).
111. - S.C. at __, 294 S.E.2d at 36.
112. 218 S.C. 537, 63 S.E.2d 476 (1951). This case quotes RESTATEMENT OF TORTs
§ 479 (1936), which lists the elements of the last clear chance doctrine:
A plaintiff who has negligently subjected himself to a risk of harm from
the defendant's subsequent negligence may recover for harm caused thereby if,
immediately preceding the harm,
(a) the plaintiff is unable to avoid it by the exercise of reasonable
vigilance and care, and
(b) the defendant
1. knows of the plaintiff's situation and realizes the helpless peril
therein; or
2. knows of the plaintiff's situation and realizes the peril involved
therein; or
3. would have discovered the plaintiff's situation and thus had
reason to realize the plaintiff's helpless peril had he exercised the
vigilance which it was his duty to the plaintiff to exercise, and
(c) thereafter is negligent in falling to utilize with reasonable care
and competence his then existing ability to avoid harming the plaintiff.
Id. at 548, 63 S.E.2d at 480.
113. Id. at 548, 63 S.E.2d at 480. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 479 com-
ment a (1965).
114. - S.C. at -, 294 S.E.2d at 36.
115. Id. at -, 294 S.E.2d at 36.
116. Record at 45. In intoxication cases, the court draws a distinction when the
plaintiff is prostrate from intoxication. In these situations the court will hold that the
extent of "helplessness interrupts the negligence of the victim so that subsequent negli-
gence of a defendant brings into play the rule of last clear chance." Jones, 218 S.C. at
550, 63 S.E.2d at 482.
117. See also Hopkins v. Reynolds, 243 S.C. 568, 135 S.E.2d 75 (holding that the
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Under Brown v. George, a trial judge must not charge a jury
on the last clear chance doctrine unless the evidence tends to
show that the plaintiff was in inextricable peril and that the de-
fendant could have avoided injury to the plaintiff despite the
latter's conduct. Evidence tending to show only one of these ele-
ments will not support application of the doctrine.
Ruth Elaine Folline
C. Abrogation of Parental Immunity Doctrine: Prospective
Application
In Walton v. Stewart,118 the South Carolina Supreme Court
refused to retroactively apply Elam v. Elam, 9 the decision in
which it eliminated the parental immunity doctrine in South
Carolina. While other courts have found a different approach to
the same issue,1 20 the supreme court followed the lead of at least
two other jurisdictions which have held that decisions abrogat-
ing the doctrine will be applied prospectively only. 2'
On August 12, 1978, the illegitimate child, for whose benefit
the action in Walton was brought, lost his left heel while operat-
ing a lawnmower during a visit to his natural father's home. The
child normally lived with his mother and her family. He had
spent little time with his father until two years before the acci-
dent, when he began to visit his father's home for brief periods
of time. The father had provided no support for his son other
than the room, board, and small amount of clothing that were
supplied during these visits.
122
The minor's guardian ad litem brought a tort action for
damages against the father based upon negligence. The trial
judge ruled that the action was barred by the parental immunity
last clear chance doctrine is not available to a plaintiff who is guilty of concurrent and
contributory negligence continuing up to the time of the accident).
118. 277 S.C. 436, 289 S.E.2d 403 (1982).
119. 275 S.C. 132, 268 S.E.2d 109 (1980).
120. Some courts allow the new rule to operate in all similar cases in which the
injury complained of occurred on or after the date of the injury in the case adopting the
new rule. Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1971); Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634
(Me. 1979).
121. Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631 (1968); Vickers v. Vickers,
109 N.H. 69, 242 A.2d 57 (1968).
122. The child's natural mother stated that the father would give the child things
when the mother asked him to do so. 277 S.C. at 437-38, 289 S.E.2d at 404.
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doctrine, which was in effect at the time of the accident, and
granted summary judgment for the father. The supreme court
affirmed.
The court reasoned that since the injury had occurred
before its decision in Elam and since the new rule was to be
applied prospectively only,123 the parental immunity doctrine
was still applicable to the parties in Walton.124 The supreme
court found that the father's relationship with his son in Walton
was sufficient to allow application of the parental immunity doc-
trine in favor of the father. The father had a legal obligation to
support the illegitimate child, 25 and no evidence of the com-
plete emancipation needed to exempt the parent from immunity
was shown.
126
The parental immunity doctrine in South Carolina evolved
through a line of supreme court cases127 The policy arguments
advanced in support of the doctrine were that parental immu-
nity fosters family harmony and prevents collusive lawsuits.
12 8
At their inception these arguments, as applied to a close family
unit, may have had some rational basis. As the family relation-
ship becomes attenuated, however, the rationale behind these
policy arguments becomes less persuasive. Such is the case in
Walton.
The court in Walton, giving significant weight to the legal
support obligation, 29 extends immunity to a natural parent who
gives minimal support to and rarely sees his illegitimate child.
The court apparently assumed that a legal support obligation in-
dicates the existence of a family relationship that must be pro-
tected. The policy arguments in favor of parental immunity have
been held invalid, however, in cases in which only legal parent-
123. Id. at 438, 289 S.E.2d at 404.
124. Id., 289 S.E.2d at 404.
125. The court cited McGlohon v. Harlan, 254 S.C. 207, 174 S.E.2d 753 (1970), to
support this proposition. This legal obligation is statutorily mandated by S.C. CODE AN.
§ 20.7-40 (Supp. 1981).
126. Partial emancipation will not suffice to abrogate parental.immunity. Parker v.
Parker, 230 S.C. 28, 94 S.E.2d 12 (1956).
127. Gunn v. Rollings, 250 S.C. 302, 157 S.E.2d 590 (1967); Fowler v. Fowler, 242
S.C. 252, 130 S.E.2d 568 (1963); Maxey v. Sauls, 242 S.C. 247, 130 S.E.2d 570 (1963);
Kelly v. Kelly, 158 S.C. 517, 155 S.E. 883 (1930).
128. See supra note 125.
129. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-40 (Supp. 1981); McGlohen v. Harlan, 254 S.C. 207, 174
S.E.2d 753 (1970).
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age 3 exists.131
The supreme court cited Hyder v. Jones13 2 and Brown v.
Anderson County Hospital Association s s as support for its de-
cision in Walton to apply the abrogation of the parental immu-
nity doctrine prospectively. The Brown decision applied a new,
judicially created rule prospectively so that affected persons
could obtain liability insurance. No real prospect exists, how-
ever, that parents in respondent's position will obtain liability
insurance to cover a negligent act such as the one in Walton.
Thus, the reasoning of Brown may be inapposite. Further, the
Hyder decision prospectively applied a statute abrogating paren-
tal immunity in automobile accident cases. Because statutes are
presumed to operate prospectively, the court reasoned that the
statute involved created a new right of action rather than a mere
change in procedure. Although a decision creating a new remedy
where none previously existed should be applied prospec-
tively,13 4 the abrogation of the parental immunity rule did not
create a new remedy; it lifted the bar to an existing one. Thus,
Hyder may also be inapplicable to the facts in Walton.
Walton v. Stewart makes it clear that illegitimate, uneman-
cipated minors have no causes of action in negligence against ei-
ther of their natural parents for injuries that occurred before the
decision abrogating the parental immunity doctrine. If the child
receives any support from the parent, that parent will be im-
mune from suit even though he does not have primary custody
of the child. The court's decision has no bearing upon causes of
action arising after July 2, 1980, the date of the decision in Elam
v. Elam
Charles J. Baker, III
130. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
131. Cf. Fugate v. Fugate, 582 S.W.2d 663 (Mo. 1979) (where parents are divorced,
the parent not having primary custody when the tort occurs cannot invoke parental im-
munity because the traditional family has been disrupted prior to the injury); Kiefer v.
Kiefer, 497 S.W.2d 851 (Mo. 1973)(child should at least be allowed to show evidence that
there was no family relationship to protect).
132. 271 S.C. 85, 245 S.E.2d 123 (1978).
133. 268 S.C. 479, 234 S.E.2d 873 (1977). See also Peters v. McCalla, 461 F. Supp.
14 (D.S.C. 1978); Douglass v. Florence General Hospital, 273 S.C. 716, 259 S.E.2d 117
(1979).
134. Jacobus v. Colgate, 217 N.Y. 235, 111 N.E. 837 (1916).
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IV. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
The South Carolina Supreme Court in Claytor v. General
Motors Corp.135 held that certain lug bolts manufactured by
General Motors were not in a defective condition when they left
the General Motors plant.136 The court also ruled that General
Motors did not owe a duty to users of its product to warn of the
dangers of overtightening lug nuts.137 Since two judges dissented
and the basis of the majority opinion is not clear, Claytor offers
little guidance to the practitioner who is trying to determine the
method of analysis the court will apply in product defect cases.
The plaintiffs in Claytor were traveling on a secondary road
when an Oldsmobile being driven in the opposite direction went
out of control causing the two vehicles to collide. Evidence
presented at trial indicated that the General Motors vehicle was
out of control because it had lost one of its wheels. Expert testi-
mony suggested that the lug bolts connecting the wheel to the
vehicle had been cracked by overtightening of the lug nuts.
These cracks subsequently enlarged, causing the lug bolts to
break and the wheel to separate from the axle. The plaintiffs
alleged separate theories of recovery based on negligence, breach
of warranty, and strict tort liability with respect to the design of
the lug bolts on the General Motors vehicle.
At trial the judge directed a verdict for General Motors, and
the jury returned a verdict for the remaining defendants."3 ' The
plaintiffs appealed from the directed verdict. They asserted that
the jury should have determined two issues: whether the lug
bolts were the product of faulty design, and whether a warning
should have been provided regarding the dangers which could
result from overtightening the lug bolts. 39
135. 277 S.C. 259, 286 S.E.2d 129 (1982).
136. Id. at 264, 286 S.E.2d at 132.
137. Id., 286 S.E.2d at 132.
138. The plaintiffs brought actions against the manufacturer of the vehicle, the local
dealership which allegedly overtightened the lug nuts, and the owners and operators of
the other vehicle. Id. at 261, 286 S.E.2d at 130.
139. The General Motors service manual specifies that 80 foot pounds of torque
should be applied when tightening each lug nut. Testimony at trial indicated that the lug
bolts would crack when subjected to the pressure of 200 foot pounds. There was also
testimony "that a man of normal size, using a star wrench or common lug wrench could
exert the necessary pull to initially crack the lug bolt." Id. at 266, 286 S.E.2d at 133
(Lewis, C.J., dissenting).
[Vol. 35
24
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 13
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol35/iss1/13
The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the evidence
introduced at trial indicated the lug bolts were not in a defective
condition when they left the General Motors factory.140 The
court observed that merely because a product can be much bet-
ter or safer, it cannot be considered defective unless the evi-
dence as a whole suggests "the product is unreasonably danger-
ous to the consumer or user given the conditions and
circumstances that forseeably attend use of the product."'1' The
court reasoned that the failure of the bolts was caused not by
their design but by their being overtightened during servicing.
Addressing the question whether General Motors had ade-
quately warned against overtightening of the lug nuts, the ma-
jority in Claytor noted that "[i]t is common knowledge" 142 that
if one applies excessive force to a nut, it will crack. Adding that
the mechanic who overtightened the nut should himself have
known this, the court ruled that the circumstances did not re-
quire a warning.
143
When one looks to Claytor for guidance in the area of defec-
tive products law one finds the opinion is less than precise in its
reasoning. To properly analyze the issues of defective design and
insufficient warning, the court should have begun by choosing an
appropriate test of product defectiveness to which the facts
could then be applied.1 44 Then, if the evidence were susceptible
of more than one reasonable inference, a jury issue would exist.
The court did not take this approach, however; indeed it is un-
clear which test it actually used to decide the case. Although
language in the opinion indicates the use of a consumer expecta-
tions test,145 a cost-benefit test is also mentioned.
46
140. Id. at 264, 286 S.E.2d at 132.
141. Id. at 262-63, 286 S.E.2d at 131 (citing Kennedy v. Custom Ice Equipment Co.,
Inc., 271 S.C. 171, 246 S.E.2d 176 (1978)).
142. 277 S.C. at 265, 286 S.E.2d at 132.
143. Id. at 261, 286 S.E.2d at 130.
144. For a discussion of the considerations relating to determining what test to ap-
ply, see F.P. Hubbard, Efficiency, Expectation, and Justice: A Jurisprudential Analysis
of the Concept of Unreasonably Dangerous Product Defect, 28 S.C.L. REv. 587 (1977).
145. 277 S.C. at 262, 286 S.E.2d at 131. The court quotes RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF
ToRTs § 402A comment g (1965), which defines "defective condition" as a product "in a
condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dan-
gerous to him."
146. 277 S.C. at 263, 286 S.E.2d at 132. The court stated that for a product to be
unreasonably dangerous, numerous factors must be considered, "including the usefulness
and desirability of the product, the cost involved for added safety, the likelihood and
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When the consumer expectations test 147 is applied to the de-
sign defect issue in Claytor, it appears that a jury question did
exist. As the dissenting opinion points out, "[tihe desire to be
sure that the wheel will not come off impels the tendency in the
average individual to tighten the lug bolts as tightly as. possi-
ble.' 4  Thus, it is arguable that a reasonable juror could find
that the ordinary consumer's expectation is that lug bolts can
and should be tightened as tightly as possible to insure safety.
Evidence presented at trial indicated that a man of normal size
using a common lug wrench could exert enough force to crack
the lug bolts which were being questioned in Claytor.149 Since an
ordinary person can exert force sufficient to crack the lug bolts,
potential seriousness of injury, and the obviousness of danger." Id. at 263, 286 S.E.2d at
132.
For an analysis of the consumer expectations test and the cost-benefit test, see F.P.
Hubbard, supra note 143.
147. South Carolina has legislatively adopted RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A (1965) for the determination of liability for product defectiveness.
Section 402A is codified in S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10 (1976), which states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) The seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) It is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substan-
tial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) shall apply although
(a) The seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) The user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-20 (1976) states: "If the user or consumer discovers the de-
fect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of
the product and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery."
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-30 (1976) incorporates by reference the comments to § 402A.
The court in Hatfield v. Atlas Enterprises, Inc., 274 S.C. 247, 262 S.E.2d 900 (1980),
acknowledges that with enactment of S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-73-10, -30 (1976), South Caro-
lina recognizes the doctrine of strict liability in tort for defective products. The com-
ments to this section provide that a product is in a defective condition when "the prod-
uct is, at the time it leaves the seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the
ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him." RESTATEmENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS § 402A comment g (1965). The contemplated condition is determined by
reference to the expectations of the ordinary consumer who purchases the product with
the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to the product's characteristics.
Id., comment i. The product is "unreasonably dangerous" if the danger inherent in the
product's use exceeds the consumer's expectations. Id.
148. 277 S.C. at 268-69, 286 S.E.2d at 134.
149. Id. at 266, 286 S.E.2d at 133.
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a jury issue existed on whether the danger present in this situa-
tion exceeded consumer expectations.
Proper application of the cost-benefit test1 50 to the design
defect issue in Claytor also results in a jury question. Although
the court cited several factors to be considered in making a cost-
benefit determination,151 the opinion contains no express analy-
sis of these factors as they apply to the facts in the case. Appar-
ently the court found as a matter of law that the benefits of the
lug bolts outweighed the risks inherent in their use; therefore, no
defect existed. This conclusion is not, however, supported by the
evidence presented at trial. Testimony was offered which indi-
cated that a relatively inexpensive increase in the size of the lug
bolts would prevent the type of damage that occurred in this
case. 152 While this testimony is not conclusive,153 it does support
the contention that the jury should have decided whether the
net benefits provided by the lug bolts, as manufactured, were
outweighed by the costs required to make the bolts impervious
to the amount of tightening that was likely to be applied to
them.
Using a consumer expectations analysis, the Claytor court
addressed the warning issue and concluded that General Motors
owed no duty to warn of overtightening the lug nuts because it is
common knowledge that damage will result from the application
of excessive force to a nut.5 ' No factual basis, however, is sup-
150. The RESTATEMENT cost-benefit analysis suggests that whether a product is un-
reasonably dangerous is determined by considering whether the benefits of the product
outweigh the risks accompanying use of the product which cannot be eliminated by ex-
isting technology. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1965).
151. The factors which the court articulated in Claytor were: (1) the usefulness and
desirability of the product, (2) the cost involved for added safety, (3) the likelihood of
injury, (4) the potential seriousness of injury, and (5) the obviousness of danger. 277 S.C.
at 262, 286 S.E.2d at 132.
For discussion of other factors articulated by commentators, see, e.g. Montgomery
and Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liability for
Defective Products, 27 S.C.L. REV. 803 (1976), Shapo, A Representational Theory of
Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function, and Legal Liability for Product Disappoint-
ment, 60 VA. L. REv. 1109 (1974), and Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for
Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973).
152. 277 S.C. at 267, 286 S.E.2d at 133.
153. The increased cost per bolt must be multiplied by the number of lug bolts that
would be manufactured in the future, and this cost factor must be considered with the
other factors previously articulated.
154. Id. at 265, 286 S.E.2d at 132.
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plied for this asserted empirical generalization. Moreover, the
purported common knowledge about overtightening does not
support the court's conclusion. It was not clear from the evi-
dence that the reasonable person would know how much force
would constitute "excessive" force on the lugs in question. If the
amount of force necessary to damage the lug bolt was less than
the amount the ordinary consumer contemplates would be re-
quired to adequately fasten a wheel, then a warning was re-
quired to alter the ordinary consumer's expectations.
Under a cost-benefit analysis of the warning question, a
duty to warn would exist if the cost of giving the warning were
less than the cost of the accidents the warning might prevent.
The facts presented in Claytor suggest that a printed warning in
the Oldsmobile owner's manual would most likely have pre-
vented enough accidents to make the cost of providing the warn-
ing appear insignificant. Thus, under both the consumer expec-
tations and the cost-benefit tests, there existed a jury issue on
whether General Motors had a duty to warn of the risks of over-
tightening these specific lug bolts.
Even if a jury were to find that the lug bolts or warning
were defective, the plaintiffs would have had to show that the
defect was both the cause in fact and the proximate cause of the
injury.1"5 While a cause in fact issue did not exist on the design
defect, this issue did apply to the warning defect. If the warning
were given to the consumer, it would not have affected the
mechanic's conduct. Arguably then, the lack of warning could
not have been the cause in fact of the injury. 156
It follows, then, that a proximate cause issue also existed,
for if it were not foreseeable that the mechanic would over-
tighten the lug bolts, the mechanic's improper tightening would
155. Whether a defect is the cause in fact of the injury is usually determined by
applying the "but for" test. That is, if the injury would not have occurred "but for" the
defect, then the defect is the cause in fact of the injury. See, e.g., Horton v. Greyhound
Corp., 241 S.C. 430, 128 S.E.2d 776 (1962)("but for" test used to determine whether the
plaintiff's contributory negligence was a cause in fact of the accident).
Whether the defect was the proximate cause of the injury is a judicial policy deter-
mination of the extent to which a defendant will be held liable for his acts. See generally
W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 41-42 (4th ed. 1971). For South Caro-
lina cases, see Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 270 S.C. 453, 242 S.E.2d 671 (1978)(discussing
relation between causation and foreseeabiity); Hughes v. Children's Clinic, P.., 269
S.C. 389, 237 S.E.2d 753 (1977).
156. See infra notes 158-159 and accompanying text.
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TORTS
then be a supervening cause in the chain of causation between
General Motors and the injury. 157 In addressing this proximate
cause issue the Claytor court simply held that the proximate
cause of the damage to the lug bolts and the collision causing
the plaintiffs' injuries was the mechanic's improper application
of torque.158 The court's conclusion that the proximate cause of
the injury was the mechanic's negligence does not, however, nec-
essarily lead to the conclusion that no defect existe& In fact,
this approach is contrary to the proximate cause analysis that
the court has used in past decisions."' The court has stated that
when there is a contention that an intervening agency interrupts
the foreseeable chain of events, the primary wrongdoer is, never-
theless, liable if the acts of the intervening agency were
foreseeable.
Applying this analysis to the facts in Claytor, the resolution
of the proximate cause question depends upon whether it was
foreseeable that an objective, knowledgeable mechanic would
overtighten these lug nuts. If indeed this act was foreseeable,
General Motors had a duty either to properly design the product
or adequately warn of its dangers. Failure to do either consti-
tuted the proximate cause of the injury.
In Claytor, the issue was not whether General Motors was
liable. Rather, the issue was whether a jury question existed re-
garding several issues: (1) design defect, (2) warning defect,
(3) cause in fact, and (4) proximate cause. A careful application
of the Restatement analysis to the facts in this case should have
resulted in the submission of these issues to the jury. Instead,
the court upheld the directed verdict without clearly explaining
what analytical framework it was using or how the facts should
be applied to that framework. The effect of Claytor on South
Carolina products liability law is to create additional confusion
in an area in dire need of analytical clarity.
David E. Dukes
157. 277 S.C. at 265, 286 S.E.2d at 132.
158. See, e.g., Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 270 S.C. at 463, 242 S.E.2d at 676 (1978);
Stone v. Bethea, 251 S.C. 157, 161, 161 S.E.2d 171, 173 (1968).
159. Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 270 S.C. at 463, 242 S.E.2d at 676.
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